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Abstract
The next bit test was introduced by Blum and Micali and proved by Yao to be a universal test for
cryptographic pseudorandom generators. On the other hand, no universal test for the cryptographic one-
wayness of functions (or permutations) is known, though the existence of cryptographic pseudorandom
generators is equivalent to that of cryptographic one-way functions. In the quantum computation model,
Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral gave a sufficient condition of (cryptographic) quantum one-way permutations
and conjectured that the condition would be necessary. In this paper, we affirmatively settle their conjecture
and complete a necessary and sufficient for quantum one-way permutations. The necessary and sufficient
condition can be regarded as a universal test for quantum one-way permutations, since the condition is
described as a collection of stepwise tests similar to the next bit test for pseudorandom generators.
1 Introduction
One-way functions are functions f such that, for each x, f (x) is efficiently computable but, only for a negligible
fraction of y, f −1(y) is computationally tractable. While the modern cryptography depends heavily on one-
way functions, the existence of one-way functions is one of the most important open problems in theoretical
computer science. On the other hand, Shor [12] showed that famous candidates of one-way functions such as
the RSA function or the discrete logarithm function are no longer one-way in the quantum computation model.
Nonetheless, some cryptographic applications based on quantum one-way functions have been considered (see,
e.g., [1, 5]).
As a cryptographic primitive other than one-way functions, pseudorandom generators have been studied
well. Blum and Micali [3] proposed how to construct pseudorandom generators from one-way permutations
and introduced the next bit test for pseudorandom generators. (They actually constructed a pseudorandom
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generator assuming the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.) Since Yao [13] proved that the next bit test
is a universal test for pseudorandom generators, the Blum–Micali’s construction paradigm of pseudorandom
generators from one-way permutations was accomplished. In the case of pseudorandom generators based on
one-way permutations, the next bit unpredictability can be proved by using the hard-core predicates for one-
way permutations. After that, Goldreich and Levin [6] showed that there exists a hard-core predicate for any
one-way function (and also permutation) and Håstad et al. [9] showed that the existence of pseudorandom
generators is equivalent to that of one-way functions.
Yao’s result on the universality of the next bit test assumes that any bits appeared in pseudorandom bits are
computationally unbiased. Schrift and Shamir [11] extended Yao’s result to the biased case and proposed uni-
versal tests for nonuniform distributions. On the other hand, no universal test for the one-wayness of a function
(or a permutation) is known, although pseudorandom generators and one-way functions (or permutations) are
closely related.
In the quantum computation model, Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10] gave a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of worst-case quantum one-way permutations. They also considered the crypto-
graphic (i.e., average-case) quantum one-way permutations and gave a sufficient condition of (cryptographic)
quantum one-way permutations. They also conjectured that the condition would be necessary. Their conditions
are based on the efficient implementability of reflection operators about some class of quantum states. Note
that the reflection operators are successfully used in the Grover’s algorithm [8] and the quantum amplitude
amplification technique [4]. To obtain a sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations,
a notion of “pseudo identity” operators was introduced [10]. Since the worst-case hardness of reflection oper-
ators is concerned with the worst-case hardness of the inversion of the permutation f , we need some technical
tool with which the inversion process of f becomes tolerant of some computational errors in order to obtain
a sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations. Actually, pseudo identity operators
permit of exponentially small errors during the inversion process [10].
In this paper, we complete a necessary and sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permu-
tations conjectured in [10]. We incorporate their basic ideas with a probabilistic argument in order to obtain
a technical tool to permit of polynomially small errors during the inversion process. Roughly saying, pseudo
identity operators are close to the identity operator in a sense. The similarity is defined by an intermediate
notion between the statistical distance and the computational distance. In [10], it is “by upper-bounding the
similarity” that the sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations was obtained. By us-
ing a probabilistic argument, we can estimate the expectation of the similarity and then handle polynomially
small errors during the inversion of the permutation f .
Moreover, the necessary and sufficient condition of quantum one-way permutations can be regard as a
universal test for the quantum one-wayness of permutations. To discuss universal tests for the one-wayness of
permutations, we briefly review the universality of the next bit test for pseudorandom generators. Let g(x) be
a length-regular deterministic function such that g(x) is of length ℓ(n) for any x of length n. The universality
of the next bit test says that we have only to check a collection of stepwise polynomial-time tests T1, ..., Tℓ(n)
instead of considering all the polynomial-time tests that try to distinguish the truly random bits from output bits
from g, where each Ti is the test whether, given the (i − 1)-bits prefix of g(x) (and the value of ℓ(|x|)), the i-th
bit of g(x) is predictable or not with probability non-negligibly higher than 1/2. Our necessary and sufficient
condition of quantum one-way permutations says that the quantum one-wayness of a given permutation f can
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be checked by a collection of stepwise tests T ′1, ..., T
′
n instead of considering all the tests of polynomial-size
quantum circuit, where each T ′i is the test whether, given some quantum state qi−1 that can be defined by using
the (i − 1)-bits prefix of f (x), some other quantity ti is computable with polynomial-size quantum circuit or not
and the next state qi can be determined from qi−1 and ti. In this sense, our universal test for quantum one-way
permutations is analogous to the universal test (i.e., the next bit test) for pseudorandom generators.
2 Preliminaries
We say that a unitary operator (on n qubits) is easy if there exists a quantum circuit implementing U with
polynomial size in n and a set F of unitary operators is easy if every U ∈ F is easy. Throughout this paper,
we assume that f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a length-preserving permutation unless otherwise stated. Namely, for
any x ∈ {0, 1}n, f (x) is an n-bits string and the set { f (x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n} is of cardinality 2n for every n. First, we
mention some useful operators in describing the previous and our results. The tagging operators O j are defined
as follows:
O j|x〉|y〉 =

−|x〉|y〉 if f (y)(2 j,2 j+1) = x(2 j,2 j+1)
|x〉|y〉 if f (y)(2 j,2 j+1) , x(2 j,2 j+1)
where y(i, j) denotes the substring from the i-th bit to the j-th bit of the bit string y. Note that these unitary
operators O j are easy. Next, we consider the reflection operators Q j( f ) as follows:
Q j( f ) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉〈x| ⊗ (2|ψ j,x〉〈ψ j,x | − I)
where
|ψ j,x〉 =
1√
2n−2 j
∑
y: f (y)(1,2 j)=x(1,2 j)
|y〉.
(See Fig. 1 for the reflection operator.) We sometimes use the notation Q j instead of Q j( f ).
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Fig. 1: Reflection operator
Actually, these reflection operators are somewhat special for our purpose. In general, reflection operators
are commonly and successfully used in the Grover’s algorithm [8] and the quantum amplitude amplification
technique [4].
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Theorem 2.1 (Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10]) Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a permutation. Then f is
worst-case quantum one-way if and only if the set Fn = {Q j( f )} j=0,1,..., n2−1 of unitary operators is not easy.
As a part of the proof of Theorem 2.1, Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10] give a quantum algorithm (we
call Algorithm INV in what follows) computing f −1 by using unitary operators O j and Q j. The initial input
state to INV is assumed to be
1√
2n
|x〉
∑
y∈{0,1}n
|y〉,
where INV trys to compute f −1(x). Then INV performs the following steps:
foreach j = 0 to n2 − 1
(step W.j.1) Apply O j to the first and the second registers;
(step W.j.2) Apply Q j to the first and the second registers.
After each step, we have the following:
(the state after step W.j.1) = 2
j
√
2n
|x〉

√
2n−2 j|ψ j,x〉 − 2
∑
y: f (y)(1,2 j+2)=x(1,2 j+2)
|y〉
 .
(the state after step W.j.2) = 2
j+1
√
2n
|x〉
∑
y: f (y)(1,2 j+2)=x(1,2 j+2)
|y〉.
Before reviewing a known sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations, we define
two types of cryptographic “one-wayness” in the quantum computational setting.
Definition 2.1 A permutation f is weakly quantum one-way if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. f can be computed by a polynomial size quantum circuit (and whenever inputs are classical the corre-
sponding outputs must be classical).
2. There exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every polynomial size quantum circuit A and all sufficiently
large n’s,
Pr[A( f (Un)) , Un] > 1p(n) ,
where Un is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n.
Definition 2.2 A permutation f is strongly quantum one-way if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. f can be computed by a polynomial size quantum circuit (and whenever inputs are classical the corre-
sponding outputs must be classical).
2. For every polynomial size quantum circuit A and every polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large n’s,
Pr[A( f (Un)) = Un] < 1p(n) .
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As in the classical one-way permutations, we can show that the existence of weakly quantum one-way per-
mutations is equivalent to that of strongly quantum one-way permutations (see, e.g., [7]). Thus, we consider
the weakly quantum one-way permutations in this paper. While Theorem 2.1 is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition of worst-case quantum one-way permutations, Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10] also gave a sufficient
condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations by using the following notion.
Definition 2.3 Let d(n) ≥ n be a polynomial in n and Jn be a d(n)-qubit unitary operator. Jn is called
(a(n), b(n))-pseudo identity if there exists a set Xn ⊆ {0, 1}n such that |Xn|/2n ≤ b(n) and for any z ∈ {0, 1}n \ Xn
|1 − (〈z|1〈0|2)Jn(|z〉1|0〉2)| ≤ a(n),
where |z〉1 is the n-qubit basis state for each z and |0〉2 corresponds to the ancillae of d(n) − n qubits.
The closeness between a pseudo identity operator and the identity operator is measured by a pair of param-
eters a(n) and b(n). The first parameter a(n) is a measure of a statistical property and the second one b(n) is
a measure of a computational property. Note that we do not care where each z ∈ Xn is mapped by the pseudo
identity operator Jn. While we will give a necessary and sufficient condition of quantum one-way permuta-
tions by using the notion of pseudo identity, we introduce a new notion, which may be helpful to understand
intuitions of our and previous conditions, in the following.
Definition 2.4 Let d′(n) ≥ n be a polynomial in n and Pn be a d′(n)-qubit unitary operator. Pn is called
(a(n), b(n))-pseudo reflection (with respect to |ψ(z)〉) if there exists a set Xn ⊆ {0, 1}n such that |Xn|/2n ≤ b(n)
and for any z ∈ {0, 1}n \ Xn∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣1 −
(
〈z|1〈w|2
( ∑
y∈{0,1}n
|y〉〈y|1 ⊗ (2|ψ(y)〉〈ψ(y)| − I)2
)
〈0|3
)
Pn(|z〉1|w〉2|0〉3)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ a(n).
The above definition of pseudo reflection operators is somewhat complicated. Since Fig. 2 illustrates a
geometrical intuition, it may be helpful to understand the idea of pseudo reflection operators. Let Jn be a
d(n)-qubit (a(n), b(n))-pseudo identity operator. Then (In ⊗ Jn)†(Q j ⊗ Id(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn) is a (d(n) + n)-qubit
(a′(n), b′(n))-pseudo reflection operator with respect to |ψ j,x〉, where a′(n) ≤ 2a(n) and b′(n) ≤ 2b(n). These
estimations of a′(n) and b′(n) are too rough to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition. Rigorously estimating
these parameters is a main technical issue in this paper.
Theorem 2.2 (Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10]) Let f be a permutation that can be computed by a polynomial-
size quantum circuit. If f is not (weakly) quantum one-way, then for any polynomial p and infinitely many n,
there exist a polynomial rp(n) and a rp(n)-qubit (1/2p(n), 1/p(n))-pseudo identity operator Jn such that the
family of pseudo reflection operators
Fp,n( f ) = {(In ⊗ Jn)†(Q j( f ) ⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn)} j=0,1,..., n2−1
is easy.
Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10] conjectured that the converse of Theorem 2.2 should still hold and
proved a weaker version of the converse as follows.
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Theorem 2.3 (Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10]) Let f be a permutation that can be computed by a polynomial-
size quantum circuit. If for any polynomial p and infinitely many n there exist a polynomial rp(n) and a rp(n)-
qubit (1/2p(n), p(n)/2n)-pseudo identity operator Jn such that the family of pseudo reflection operators
Fp,n( f ) = {(In ⊗ Jn)†(Q j( f ) ⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn)} j=0,1,..., n2−1
is easy, then f is not (weakly) quantum one-way.
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Fig. 2: Pseudo reflection operator
We mention why it is difficult to show the converse of Theorem 2.2. To prove it by contradiction, all we can
assume is the existence of a pseudo identity operator. This means that we cannot know how the pseudo identity
operator is close to the identity operator. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce a probabilistic technique and
estimate the expected behavior of the pseudo identity operator. Eventually, we give a necessary and sufficient
condition of the existence of quantum one-way permutations in terms of reflection operators. This says that we
affirmatively settle their conjecture.
3 Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Quantum One-way Permutations
We have a necessary and sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations as follows.
Theorem 3.1 The following statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a weakly quantum one-way permutation.
2. There exists a polynomial-time computable function f satisfying that there exists a polynomial p such that
for all sufficiently large n’s, any polynomial rp(n) and any rp(n)-qubit (1/2p(n), 1/p(n))-pseudo identity
operator Jn such that the family of pseudo reflection operators
Fn,p( f ) = {(In ⊗ Jn)†(Q j( f ) ⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn)} j=0,1,..., n2−1
is not easy.
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To grasp the intuition of Theorem 3.1, Fig 3. may be helpful. Theorem 3.1 can be proved as the combination
of Theorem 2.2 and the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Let f be a permutation that can be computed by a polynomial-size quantum circuit. If for any
polynomial p and infinitely many n there exist a polynomial rp(n) and a rp(n)-qubit (1/2p(n), 1/p(n))-pseudo
identity operator Jn such that the family of pseudo reflection operators
Fn,p( f ) = { ˜Q j( f )} = {(In ⊗ Jn)†(Q j( f ) ⊗ Irp(n)−n)(In ⊗ Jn)} j=0,1,..., n2−1
is easy, then f is not (weakly) quantum one-way.
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Fig. 3: Basic operations for the inversion
Proof. Suppose that for any polynomial p(n), infinitely many n, and some (1/2p(n), 1/p(n))-pseudo identity
operator Jn, the family Fp,n of unitary operators is easy. Moreover, let f be a weakly quantum one-way per-
mutation. By a probabilistic argument, we show that a contradiction follows from this assumption. For more
detail, we construct an efficient inverter for f using Fp,n and then, if we choose a polynomial p(n) appropriately,
this efficient inverter can compute x from f (x) for a large fraction of inputs, which violates the assumption that
f is a weakly quantum one-way permutation.
We first construct a polynomial-size algorithm av-INV to invert f by using unitary operations in Fp,n.
Algorithm av-INV is almost similar to Algorithm INV except the following change: the operator Q j is now
replaced with ˜Q j. The initial input state to av-INV is also assumed to be
1√
2n
|x〉1
∑
y∈{0,1}n
|y〉2|0〉3,
where |z〉1 (resp., |z〉2 and |z〉3) denotes the first n-qubit (resp., the second n-qubit and the last (rp(n) − n)-qubit)
register.
Algorithm av-INV performs the following steps:
foreach j = 0 to n2 − 1
(step j.1) Apply O j to the first and the second registers;
(step j.2) Apply ˜Q j to all the registers.
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For analysis of Algorithm av-INV, we use the following functionally equivalent description. (Note that the
following procedure may not be efficient though the behavior is equivalent to Algorithm av-INV.)
foreach j = 0 to n2 − 1
(step A.j.1) Apply O j to the first and the second registers;
(step A.j.2) Apply Jn to the second and third registers;
(step A.j.3) Apply Q j to the first and the second registers;
(step A.j.4) Apply J†n to the second and third registers.
Then, we can prove the following two claims.
Claim 3.1 Suppose that f is a weakly quantum one-way permutation, i.e., there exists a polynomial r(n) ≥ 1
such that for every polynomial size quantum circuit A and all sufficiently large n’s, Pr[A( f (Un)) , Un] > 1/r(n).
Then, there are at least 2n(1/r(n) − 1/q2(n))/(1 − 1/q2(n)) x’s such that A cannot compute x from f (x) with
probability at least 1 − 1/q2(n).
Claim 3.2 Let q(n) = p1/4(n)/√2n. There are at most 2n/q(n) x’s such that Algorithm av-INV cannot compute
x from f (x) with probability at least 1 − 1/q2(n).
The proof of Claim 3.2 is delayed and that of Claim 3.1 follows immediately from the definition of a weakly
quantum one-way permutation by a counting argument.
Recall that we assume that f is a weakly quantum one-way permutation at the beginning of this proof. Now,
we can set p(n) = 4n2(r(n) + 1)4, that is, q(n) = r(n) + 1 ≥ 2. It follows that (1/r(n) − 1/q2(n))/(1 − 1/q2(n)) >
1/q(n), which is a contradiction since av-INV is an inverter violating the assumption of a weakly quantum
one-way permutation f . This implies that f is not weakly quantum one-way.
In what follows, we present a proof of Claim 3.2 to complete the proof of this theorem.
Proof of Claim 3.2. From the definition of pseudo identity operators, there exists a set Xn ⊆ {0, 1}n with
|Xn| ≤ 2n/p(n) such that for any y ∈ Yn = {0, 1}n \ Xn,
Jn|y〉2|0〉3 = αy|y〉2|0〉3 + |ψy〉23,
where |ψy〉23⊥|y〉2|0〉3 and |1 − αy| ≤ 12p(n) .
In Algorithm av-INV, we apply Jn before and after step A.j.3 for each j. The application of Jn makes an
error in computation of f −1. We call the vector Jn|ψ〉 − |ψ〉 the error associated to |ψ〉. To measure the effect
of this error, we use the following lemmas. (Lemma 3.2 itself was stated in [10].) We note, in the sequel, the
norm over vectors is Euclidean.
Lemma 3.1 Assume that T ⊆ S ⊆ {0, 1}n. Then length l(S , T ) of the error associated to the state
|ψ(S , T )〉 = 1√|S |
 ∑
y∈S \T
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈T
|y〉|0〉

satisfies that
l(S , T ) ≤ 2
√
|S ∩ Xn|
|S | + γ(n),
where γ(n) is a negligible function in n.
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Proof. First, we restate the property of the length of the error associated to the state |y〉|0〉 which was shown
in [10]. The property is that the length is at most 22p(n)/2 if y ∈ Yn and at most 2 if y ∈ Xn. Using this property
more carefully, we have a more tight bound of l(S , T ) as follows:
l(S , T ) = |Jn|ψ(S , T )〉 − |ψ(S , T )〉|
=
1√|S |
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(Jn − I)
 ∑
y∈Yn∩(S \T )
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Yn∩T
|y〉|0〉 +
∑
y∈Xn∩(S \T )
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1√|S |
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(Jn − I)
 ∑
y∈Yn∩(S \T )
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Yn∩T
|y〉|0〉

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1√|S |
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(Jn − I)

∑
y∈Xn∩(S \T )
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1√|S |
 ∑
y∈Yn∩(S \T )
|Jn|y〉|0〉 − |y〉|0〉| +
∑
y∈Yn∩T
|Jn|y〉|0〉 − |y〉|0〉|

+
1√|S |

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Jn

∑
y∈Xn∩(S \T )
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Xn∩(S \T )
|y〉|0〉 −
∑
y∈Xn∩T
|y〉|0〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ 2
2p(n)/2
|S ∩ Yn|√|S | +
2√|S |
√
(|Xn ∩ (S \ T )| + |Xn ∩ T |)
=
2
2p(n)/2
|S ∩ Yn|√|S | + 2
√
|S ∩ Xn|
|S | .
Let γ(n) be the former term in the above inequality. Then
γ(n) = 2
2p(n)/2
|S ∩ Yn|√|S |
<
2n+1
2p(n)/2
<
1
2n
and is negligible. 
Lemma 3.2 Let Jn|ψ(S , T )〉 = α|ψ(S , T )〉 + |ψ(S , T )⊥〉, where |ψ(S , T )〉⊥|ψ(S , T )⊥〉. Then, ||ψ(S , T )⊥〉| ≤
l(S , T ).
By using Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we consider the effect of the additional applications of pseudo identity
operators to INV in order to analyze Algorithm av-INV.
For each j, we let S x, j = {y : f (y)(1,2 j) = x(1,2 j)} and Tx, j = {y : f (y)(1,2 j+2) = x(1,2 j+2)}. We assume that the
state before step A.j.2 is
|x〉1|ψ(S x, j, Tx, j)〉23 = |x〉1 2
j
√
2n

∑
y∈S x, j\Tx, j
|y〉2 −
∑
y∈Tx, j
|y〉2
 |0〉3.
Note that the above state is the same as the one before W. j.2 in Algorithm INV.
In step A.j.2, Jn is applied to the state. From Lemma 3.1 and a probabilistic argument, we have the
following.
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Lemma 3.3 For each j,
E[l(S x, j, Tx, j)] ≤ 2√
p(n)
+ γ(n),
where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n and γ(n) is a negligible function in n.
Proof. Since f is a permutation, by the definition of S x, j, |S x, j | = 2n−2 j. Also, y ∈ S x, j for some x if and only
if y(1,2 j) = x(1,2 j). Then,
Pr
[
y ∈ S x, j
]
=
2n−2 j
2n
=
1
22 j
,
where the probability is taken over x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly. Since, for any (1/2p(n), 1/p(n))-pseudo identity,
E[|Xn ∩ S x, j|] =
|Xn|
22 j
, |S x, j | = 2n−2 j, and
|Xn|
2n
=
1
p(n) ,
it holds that
E
[ |Xn ∩ S x, j |
|S x, j|
]
=
1
p(n) ,
where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n. By Lemma 3.1,
E
[
l(S x, j, Tx, j)
]
≤ 2E

√
|Xn ∩ S x, j|
|S x, j|
 + γ(n) ≤ 2
√
E
[ |Xn ∩ S x, j |
|S x, j|
]
+ γ(n) = 2√
p(n)
+ γ(n)
for some negligible function γ. 
From Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, we obtain a vector v = v1 + v2 where v1/|v1| is the unit vector corre-
sponding to the state before step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV and v2 is a vector of expected length at most 2/
√
p(n)
orthogonal to v1. (For simplicity, we neglect a negligible term γ(n).) The vector v2 corresponds to an error that
happens when Jn is applied before step A.j.3.
Next, we consider the state after step A.j.3. We assume that the state after step A.j.3 is
|x〉1|ψ(S j+1,∅)〉23 = |x〉1 2
j
√
2n
 ∑
y∈S x, j+1
|y〉2
 |0〉3.
Note that the above state is the same as the one after step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV. In order to analyze the effect
of the application of J†n after step A.j.3, we need another lemma similar to Lemma 3.3. (The proof is omitted
since its proof is also similar.)
Lemma 3.4 For each j,
E[l(S x, j+1,∅)] ≤ 2√
p(n)
+ γ(n),
where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n and γ(n) is a negligible function in n.
By a similar argument to the above, we obtain a vector v = v1 + v2 where v1/|v1| is the unit vector corre-
sponding to the state after step W.j.2 in Algorithm INV and v2 is a vector of expected length at most 2/
√
p(n)
orthogonal to v1. (For simplicity, we neglect a negligible term γ(n).) The vector v2 corresponds to an error that
happens when J†n is applied after step A.j.3.
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From the above analysis, we can see that after the completion of Algorithm av-INV on input x the final state
become v(x) = v1(x) + v2(x) where v1(x) is parallel to
|x〉1| f −1(x)〉2|0〉3
and v2(x) is a vector orthogonal to v1. By Lemma 3.4 and the linearity of expectation, we have
E[|v2(x)|] ≤ 2 · n2 ·
2√
p(n)
=
2n√
p(n)
≤ 1
q2(n)
for q(n) = p1/4(n)/√2n, where the expectation is over x ∈ {0, 1}n. It follows that the number of x such that
|v2(x)| > 1/q(n) is at most 2n/q(n), i.e., av-INV can invert f (x) for at least 2n(1 − 1/q(n)) x’s with probability at
least 1 − 1/q2(n). 

4 Conclusion
By giving a proof of the conjecture left by Kashefi, Nishimura and Vedral [10], we have completed a neces-
sary and sufficient condition of cryptographic quantum one-way permutations in terms of pseudo-identity and
reflection operator in this paper.
The necessary and sufficient condition of quantum one-way permutations can be regard as a universal test
for the quantum one-wayness of permutations. As long as the authors know, this is, classical or quantum,
the first result on the universality for one-way permutations, though the next bit test is a universal test for
pseudorandom generators in the classical computation. We believe that our universal test for quantum one-way
permutations may help to find good candidates for them, which are currently not known.
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